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Is it possible to boost poverty-reducing economic
investment and growth in Africa by working with,
rather than against, prevailing political-economic
realities? That is the question this article seeks
to answer. Most African political economies, it is
well known, are characterised by high levels of
clientelism, corruption and rent-seeking – a
constitutive feature of systems frequently called
‘patrimonial’ or ‘neo-patrimonial’ in
development literature. Working with African
realities consequently implies harnessing neo-
patrimonialism for developmental ends.
Working with, rather than against, neo-
patrimonialism implies a radical shift in donor
priorities, since for more than 20 years orthodox
development practice has sought to reform or
erase it via the ‘good governance agenda’.
However, an emerging body of research has begun
to question whether clientelism, corruption and
rent-seeking are as detrimental to development as
once believed, and it is on the foundations of this
counter-orthodoxy that Africa Power and Politics
Programme (APPP) research builds.
Emerging results from a comparative review of
the African and Asian development literature, a
desk-based comparison of economic performance
since independence in seven African countries,
and fieldwork in a further five countries, suggests
that neo-patrimonial governance is compatible
with strong economic performance providing two
conditions hold. First, there must be a bundle of
broadly pro-market, pro-rural policies in place;
and second, there must be an institutional system
for centralising and distributing economic rents
with a view to the long term.
The first finding, on policy, chimes with those of
two major research programmes on Africa: one is
the African Economic Research Consortium
(Ndulu et al. 2008), and the other is Leiden
University’s ‘Tracking Development’ programme
(Henley 2010; van Donge et al. 2010); we will not
rehearse it in any detail here. By contrast, our
second finding, which concerns institutions, is
comparatively novel in an African context –
although it is foreshadowed elsewhere – and we
consequently devote the bulk of our discussion to
it. The article proceeds by discussing some of the
literature on neo-patrimonialism and
development, then moves to empirical evidence
and mid-level theory construction, before
concluding.
1 Neo-patrimonialism and development in theory
The term ‘neo-patrimonialism’ grows out of Max
Weber’s notion of ‘patrimonialism’, an ‘ideal-
type’ of traditional rule in which authority is
based on ties of personal loyalty between a leader
and his administrative staff (Weber 1947). In
Weber’s schema, patrimonialism has various
76
Rethinking the Relationship between
Neo-patrimonialism and Economic
Development in Africa
Tim Kelsall*
Abstract Is it possible to work with the grain of neo-patrimonial politics to boost investment and growth in
Africa? Current donor orthodoxy is that neo-patrimonialism is irredeemably bad for economic development,
but evidence from other regions, together with a re-examination of the African record itself, suggests that
this may not be true. We present evidence from case studies of Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi and Rwanda to
show that provided mechanisms can be found to centralise economic rents and manage them with a view to
the long term, neo-patrimonialism can be harnessed for developmental ends.
IDS Bulletin Volume 42  Number 2  March 2011   © 2011 The Author. IDS Bulletin © 2011 Institute of Development Studies
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
sub-types, including ‘sultanism’ and
‘prebendalism’, but the details need not concern
us here. The important point is that in all its
variants, the system is held together by the
personal distribution of material resources and
perks (many of which are ‘rents’ in modern
economic terminology), distributed and
consumed as though they were the private
property of the ruler and/or his staff. ‘Neo-
patrimonialism’ refers to a political economy in
which this basic authority system is combined
with, or exists behind some formal, impersonal
elements of governance, like a legal system that
demarcates the public and private domain, or an
administrative code with formal criteria for staff
hiring and promotion (Zolberg 1966; Médard
1982; Chabal and Daloz 1999).
Although there may be disagreement among
Africanists over how great the personalised
aspects of administration are in specific
countries, and over the extent to which ‘neo-
patrimonialism’ has become a catch-all concept
capable of explaining everything (Therkilsden
2005), few doubt that the term captures an
important part of African political reality.
A similarly small number doubt that neo-
patrimonialism is bad for modern economic
development. Conventional wisdom holds that
the distribution of rents to political cronies tends
to create damaging market distortions harmful
to growth in the long run (Bates 1981; World
Bank 1981), while the arbitrariness and
instability said to be typical of neo-patrimonial
rule is anathema to rational capitalist investors
(Diamond 1987; Callaghy 1988). It is for these
reasons that donors have so vigorously promoted
good governance solutions, intended to break the
personalistic bonds between a ruler (patron) and
his staff (clients), strengthening more
impersonal, contractual norms (World Bank
1989; Moore 1993; Williams and Young 1994). In
the area of investment climate promotion, for
example, this is manifested in efforts to increase
regulatory transparency and promote business
associations, replacing cronyist, ‘hand-in-glove’
business–politics ties with more impersonal,
arm’s length relations, typical of best practice in
the West (Moore and Schmitz 2008).
Unfortunately, these reforms have made only
limited headway to date, and there are good
reasons not to expect rapid progress in the near
future. In the political sphere, for example, the
widespread introduction of multi-party elections
has not replaced neo-patrimonialism: it may
even have intensified it. The reason is that in
countries with weak public finances and public
services, it is very difficult for politicians to make
credible commitments to programmatic
investments in public goods such as typically win
elections in the West (Khan 2005; Keefer 2007).
Even if the finances to make such commitments
were available, it might be irrational for
politicians in young democracies to supply them.
Most voters are poorly educated, operate under
severe information constraints, and are thus not
in a position to make sound judgements about
the credibility of politician commitments to
goods of this nature (Keefer 2007). They find it
easier to evaluate a concrete donation in the
form of a private good, such as a job or a club
good, such as a local school, than programmatic
commitments to ‘employment creation’ or
‘quality education’; often they simply plump for
the candidate that is ethnically most like them,
furnishing some probability that at least their
ethnic group will be favoured (Chandra 2007;
van de Walle 2007). In fact, game theory tells us
that rational voters will always prefer politicians
that operate clientelistically until incomes reach
such a level that they are indifferent to the
private goods politicians can supply (Lyne 2007).
So it is that in most parts of the continent multi-
party democracy has not led to increasingly
contractual relations between voters and
politicians over manifesto commitments;
normally it has led to increased clientelist
pressures, at best a downward extension or
inversion of the patrimonial pyramid.
When it comes to business–politics relations,
there are significant disincentives to levelling
playing fields and making regulation
transparent. To begin with, because markets in
most African countries are poorly developed,
political power is often the easiest route to
wealth (Diamond 1988). Neo-patrimonialism
allows African politicians to supplement their
incomes through corruption, or to use the power
of the state to gain a foothold in business.
Second, the business sector is a valuable source
of rents for politicians to distribute in the
interests of buying off political rivals, or winning
election contests: from an individualistic
perspective, African politicians have little
interest in nurturing an independent business
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sector (Emery 2003). And it is important to note
that this is not merely an African phenomenon.
For North et al. (2006), the majority of states in
human history, and certainly most falling
between primitive hunter-gatherer society and
advanced industrial society, have been ‘limited
access orders’ in which ‘the political system
manipulates the economy to create rents as a
means of solving the problem of violence’ (North
et al. 2006: 3).
If neo-patrimonialism is here to stay, at least for
the foreseeable future, the prognosis for African
economic development appears bleak. Or does it?
In recent years, a growing number of counter-
orthodox studies has begun to question whether
good governance arrangements are the best or
only route to progress in developing countries
(Chang 2003; Grindle 2004; Khan 2006; Rodrik
2007; Moore and Schmitz 2008; Levy 2010).
Evidence from Asia, where cronyism, corruption
and rent-seeking appear to have been compatible
in some cases with very rapid, poverty-reducing
growth, shows that ‘good’ governance is not
essential for strong economic performance.
Governance need only be ‘good enough’ (Grindle
2004), and a variety of institutional forms can
satisfy investors’ functional needs (Rodrik 2007).
Some Africanist work has drawn attention to
similar issues. For example, in an important
article, Chris Allen (1995) rejected the idea that
all African countries had been equally
dysfunctional, arguing that the more stable and
successful economies had endured by introducing
forms of centralised bureaucracy. Sandbrook
(1985) recognised that rulers of exceptional skill,
like Côte d’Ivoire’s Houphouët-Boigny, had been
able to prevent the personalised state’s
characteristic downward slide. Richard Crook
(1989) went so far as to coin the term
‘developmental patrimonialism’ in that
connection. Even Jackson and Rosberg (1982),
responsible for some of the more lurid images of
neo-patrimonial governance on the continent,
recognised that personal rule had brought
political stability to large parts of Africa for
significant periods of time.
Greater insight into how it is that clientelism,
corruption, and rent-seeking can sometimes be
compatible with development is provided by
Mushtaq Khan’s work, which focuses on the role
of economic rents in development. According to
Khan (2000b), rents are ‘excess incomes’, which
in perfectly efficient markets should not exist.
However, in the real world, rents are widespread,
taking such forms as profits from monopoly
trading, income from subsidies, income that
comes from owning scarce resources, or income
from corruption (Khan 2000b). Some rents are
inefficient and growth retarding, while for
others, the opposite can be true. As Khan says,
‘Managing development may, in fact, require the
continuous discrimination of efficient from
inefficient rents by policy-makers and analysts’
(Khan 2000b: 21–2).
In most developing countries, economic rents are
distributed through patron–client networks.
Managing these networks thus becomes crucial to
a political economy’s prospects for growth (Khan
2000b). The Asian cases demonstrate that
economies are able to grow even when substantial
rents are distributed to relatively unproductive
clients; however, there must be some limit to non-
productive rent creation and rent-seeking, and
this must be compensated for by more dynamic
rent use elsewhere. Policymakers need to balance
the demands of politically strategic groups for
hand-outs, then, with the hand-ups required by
genuine entrepreneurs.
Under what institutional conditions is productive
rent use likely to occur, however? Khan and
others have already gone a long way to answering
this question, especially in the Asian context
(Khan 2000a; MacIntyre 2003; Khan 2009,
2010). We have built on their findings to
illuminate our original query about whether it is
possible to harness African neo-patrimonialism
for developmental rather than predatory ends.
2 Re-examining the African record
We conducted research into economic
performance in seven ‘middle African’ countries,
initial results and the methodology of which we
have presented elsewhere (Kelsall et al. 2010). Two
variables emerged from the research as centrally
important: the degree to which the process for
creating and allocating economic rents was
centralised, and the degree to which it was oriented
to the long term. In our schema, rent
management is centralised when there is a
structure in place that allows a person or group at
the apex of the state to determine the major rents
that are created and to distribute them at will. It
is long-horizon when leaders have a vision that
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inspires them to create rents and discipline rent-
seeking with a view to expanding income through
productive investment over the long term.
Centralisation permits a leadership to put some
limits on rent-seeking and to play a coordinating
role, steering rent creation into economically high
potential areas, or to areas that must be resourced
in the interests of political stability. A long-
horizon orientation, meanwhile, is important for
reasons similar to the ones that make countries
that forego consumption in the present for
investment in the future, faster-growing over the
long run. Long-horizon rent creation means
directing a substantial portion of rent-earning
opportunities to activities that involve increases in
value-added, or transformations in the productive
forces over time – as when subsidies are provided
to an infant industry that in the long run will
compete internationally.
This does not mean, it must be stressed, either
that the motivations for creating this rent
structure are public spirited, or that all the rents
earned in this system are productive or clean.
Following the concept of ‘roving’ vs. ‘stationary’
bandits, even a purely selfish leader may
calculate that he stands to maximise his take
(i.e. his parasitic rents) from the economy if it is
allowed to grow over time (Olson 1993). The
point, however, is that some parasitic rent
collection will have to be foregone in the present
if it is to be maximised in the future, otherwise
businesses will be so burdened with parasitic
demands that they lose their ability to grow.
We can explore the relationships further by
arranging the variables along two axes, giving
rise to a matrix that shows four basic or ‘ideal’
types of rent management.
In the matrix’s top left quadrant, rent
centralisation is low and the leadership has little
interest in disciplining the rent process with a
view to the long term. In its most extreme form,
the result is a highly competitive free-for-all in
which anyone with the ability to extract rents
takes the maximum they can in the short term,
grasping as much as they can today for fear there
will be nothing left to take tomorrow. In this
scenario, economic growth is likely to be well
below potential, since out-of-control rent-seeking
stimulates investor flight. The clearest examples
from Africa might be the Nigerian First and
Second Republics, the First Republic in Congo,
or Sierra Leone under Albert Margai.
The bottom left quadrant in Table 1 represents a
relatively rare type. Here, the leadership desires
to take the long view, limiting rents so as to
maximise its own take or to serve what it views as
the interest of society as a whole. However,
because it lacks the machinery to centralise rents,
its ability actually to implement the long-term
view is strictly limited. Various periods of
Tanzanian history provide illustrations, including
Ben Mkapa’s first term in office (1995–2000). His
leadership initially appeared to be characterised
by a fairly genuine embrace of a donor-driven
development vision, together with a much-
vaunted war against corruption. However, by 2000
it was clear that on the latter front very little
progress had been made, undisciplined rent-
seeking abounded in strategic areas like tax
collection and energy production, and Mkapa
himself was soon feathering his nest.
The upper right quadrant, by contrast, describes
the situation where the leadership has had
considerable success in centralising the rent
process. Few big rents are generated or allocated
without its knowledge. In theory, the President
and his inner circle would have the power to
limit rent-taking, but for one reason or another,
they do not take the long view. In extreme cases,
the administration becomes little more than an
anti-developmental kleptocracy and economic
performance will be considerably below potential
as a result. Mobutu’s Zaire and Abacha’s Nigeria
are perhaps the archetypes.
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Table 1 Different types of rent regime
Centralisation
Low High
Time Short Free-for-all Non-developmental kleptocracy
horizon
Long Losing battle against corruption Developmental rent utilisation
The bottom right quadrant of Table 1 is the most
interesting from the point of view of our
argument. Here, the leadership has succeeded in
centralising control over rents, and also takes a
long-term approach to rent maximisation. The
regime retains a strongly patrimonial or neo-
patrimonial character, in the sense that there is
a systematic blurring of the boundaries between
public resources and the private property of the
ruler(s). It is not necessarily free of illegality or
‘corruption’; in fact, these may reach quite high
levels and may well be the major source of
finance for the political activities of the ruling
groups. However, the rent process is organised in
such a way that it does not hurt the climate for
investment in the ways that typify the other
regimes. Indeed, if it finances domestic
investment including public works and other
ventures with positive externalities for other
investors, the net effects may be quite
favourable. Corruption, too, may be less harmful
than under the other types of regime because it
is more predictable and moderated by concerns
to grow the economy. It may also be more
disciplined in structural terms, with the effect
that, for example, a professional and
hierarchically coordinated state bureaucracy is
able to be retained in the face of clientelistic
pressures. In other words, anti-corruption efforts
may be at least partly entrenched in a serious
and effective way. Within sub-Saharan Africa, we
believe Seretse Khama’s Botswana to be a good
example of this type. The virtuous circle of
developmental patrimonialism is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Greater insight into the mechanisms involved
can be provided by looking at our country case
studies. Here we concentrate on four cases:
Kenya, Rwanda, Malawi and Côte d’Ivoire, which
illustrate particularly well the relationships we
wish to highlight. Table 2 shows the relations
between regime type and economic performance.
As depicted, the strongest performing regimes in
our sample were Kenya between 1965 and 1975;
Côte d’Ivoire between 1960 and 1975; Malawi
between 1961 and 1978 and Rwanda from 2000
onwards. Aside from having a generally pro-
market, pro-rural bias in economic ideology and
policy, as predicted by other research
programmes, all the strong performers had
certain institutional characteristics in common,
manifesting a centralised, long-horizon rent
process.
The precise mechanism for centralising rents
varied from place to place, but in all cases – as
we might expect for neo-patrimonial states – it
involved a blend of top-down, personal rule with
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Figure 1 Developmental rent management
Organised clientelism
Rents used centrally 
to finance politics
Strong economic
performance
Anti-corruption
at least partly
entrenched
Key public goods
provided, including
venture capital
technocratic competence, something rather
different from the accountability relations
promoted by today’s good governance agenda.
For example, in Kenya political parties,
including the ruling party, had been emasculated
by the late 1960s, and the most important
decisions on rent utilisation were made by
President Kenyatta and his ‘Kiambu court’.
Decisions were implemented by a civil service
that had inherited much of the competence of
the British colonial administration (Leys 1975;
Tamarkin 1978). A similar story could be told for
Côte d’Ivoire, where President Houphouet-
Boigny reined in the independence of the ruling
party, so he could have the final say on important
economic decisions himself, albeit assisted by a
competent planning machinery in which French
technical advice loomed large (technocratic
decisions were then rolled out to the provinces
through the territorial administration and other
key executive agencies (Tuinder 1978; Rapley
1993). In Malawi, Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda
exercised near total domination over his MPs
and ministers whom he called ‘my boys’,
determining the main economic rents to be
created with the help of a decidedly neo-colonial
administrative corps (see Cammack, this IDS
Bulletin). In Rwanda, President Kagame has
exercised enormous personal sway over economic
decision-making, in which the ruling party
holding company, Tristar, plays a significant role
in the collection and allocation, including
reinvestment, of rents.
In all these cases, a neo-patrimonial system
characterised by top-down clientelism permitted
Presidents or ruling cliques to impose some
discipline on the utilisation of rents. In Kenya,
for example, President Kenyatta worked closely
with Charles Karanja of the Kenya Tea
Development Authority to ensure that tea-
growing did not expand into uneconomic areas
(Leonard 1991). In Côte d’Ivoire, the Caisse de
Stabilisation1 set an efficient price for cocoa
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Table 2 Regimes, rent management and economic performance
Regime Rent management Economic performance relative to potential
Côte d’Ivoire
1960–75 LC Strong
1975–80 LD Weak
1981–93 SC Mostly weak
1993 ff SD Mostly weak
Kenya
1965–75 LC Strong
1980–2002 SC Weak
2002 ff SC? Mostly reasonable
Malawi
1961–78 LC Strong
1980–94 SC Weak
1994–2004 SD Weak
2004 ff LC? Mostly strong
Rwanda
1962–73 SD Weak
1973–94 SC Mixed, mostly poor
2000 ff LC Strong
Key: LC, long-horizon, centralised; LD, long-horizon, decentralised; SC, short-horizon, centralised; SD, short-horizon,
decentralised.
growers for many years, while the Ministry of
Agriculture, provincial administration and
extension services supervised the expansion of
the cocoa industry into virgin lands (Tuinder
1978; Crook 1990). In Malawi, most parastatals
were profit-making and generated funds for
reinvestment, as did the President’s private
company, Press Holdings (see Cammack, this
IDS Bulletin). In Rwanda, meanwhile, the
administration has been subject to effective top-
down performance disciplines in all areas (see,
e.g. Golooba-Mutebi et al. 2010). In addition,
although it was common in all these countries for
state employees to leverage their public positions
for private gain (many politicians and civil
servants set themselves up in business) the
prevalence of the most damaging forms of
corruption like embezzlement or theft appears to
have been comparatively low.
We can contrast these cases with regimes where
rents were decentralised, like in Côte d’Ivoire
between 1975 and 1980. Sometime in the mid-
1970s Houphouet lost control of rent
management to his barons (Médard 1991;
Alemayehu 1997). Economic decisions were
increasingly made outside of the normal
planning process, and the result was a massive
expansion in the number of parastatal projects,
many of them inefficient (Riboud 1987; Médard
1991; Alemayehu 1997). Economic performance
declined and debt spiralled. A similar fate befell
Malawi between 1994 and 2004. President
Muluzi was so focused on securing re-election for
himself and his beleaguered party that the
discipline surrounding rents and corruption was
relaxed completely. There was an unseemly
scramble for spoils, a veritable free-for-all, and
the economy precipitously declined (see
Cammack, this IDS Bulletin).
As our matrix predicts, however, rent
centralisation is not sufficient in and of itself to
create the conditions for economic growth.
Another variable that our strong performers had
in common was a long-horizon approach to rent
management.
We can illustrate the importance of this
relationship by considering some regimes where
rents, while centralised, have not been oriented to
the long term. Daniel Arap Moi’s Kenya, between
1980 and 2002 is a case in point. Shortly after Moi
replaced Kenyatta as Kenyan President, a new
rent process came into being. The new president
focused his energies on rehabilitating KANU
(Kenya African National Union) as a personal
patronage machine. But in contrast to Kenyatta,
who had developed a set of stable long-term
patron–client relationships with local big men,
Moi assured his own ascendancy by intervening in
local power struggles, and constantly reshuffling
those beneath him (Barkan 1994; Throup and
Hornsby 1998). At the top of the system, Moi and
a handful of close cronies were using state power
to create huge business interests, while just
beneath was a patronage merry-go-round, in
which those with temporary access to power were
eating as fast as they could in the knowledge that
they would soon be dismissed from the table
(Barkan 1994; Throup and Hornsby 1998). Moi
undoubtedly had knowledge of the main rents
being created and sought after, and had the
personal authority to discipline those misusing
them. But this he chose not to do, since there
appeared to be no clear vision for how to
maximise rents over the long run. As with Malawi
in the same period, senior technocrats had lost
the competence or the confidence to advise the
President on a sensible economic strategy (see
Cammack, this IDS Bulletin). Economic
management drifted, International Monetary
Fund-backed structural adjustment proved
inconclusive, and the economy, from so promising
a position, slid backwards (Barkan 1994).
Another factor causing Moi’s economic
management to suffer was the growing
discontent that stemmed from his exclusionist
politics. Long-horizon rent management, it
should be noted, also implies an inclusive
political strategy. Rents need to be shared
around sufficiently so that no important groups
feel completely excluded (since this might
provoke an investment-deterring insurgency or
other stability-damaging violence); at the same
time, a political strategy must not be so inclusive
that rents are mostly dissipated in redistribution,
since this will starve the economy of surpluses for
investment. All of our strong performing states
distributed rents fairly inclusively, albeit around
an ethnic core – usually that of the President.
Jomo Kenyatta’s reported remark to his non-
Kikuyu ministers that ‘My people have the milk
in the morning, your tribes the milk in the
afternoon’ is a good illustration (Wrong 2009:
51).2 Contrast this with post-Houphouet Côte
d’Ivoire, where the break-up of Houphouet’s
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ethnic ‘grand coalition’ and Southern chauvinism
led to armed rebellion in the North (Akindes
2004), or Kenya under the first presidency of
Mwai Kibaki, in which Kikuyu hegemony was
perceived to be so overwhelming that political
violence ensued (Wrong 2009).
While on the subject of Kibaki’s Kenya, readers
will note that it comes with a question mark in
Table 2, being a difficult case to categorise. In
fact, its ambiguity may be representative of many
contemporary African regimes which seem to fall
between the two types of centralised, short-
horizon rent management, and a decentralised
free-for-all. A familiar story in these states is that
members of the high political leadership are
permitted to indulge in non-productive rent
creation and rent-seeking with the tacit, if not
direct knowledge of the President (who may or
may not profit personally).3 Some of the proceeds
are used to fund election expenses, and some are
pocketed privately. In addition, ruling party
candidates are permitted to engage in various
types of rent-seeking in order to fund their own
constituency campaigns. This may be coupled
with a certain permissiveness towards petty rent-
seeking at lower levels of the administration.
This scenario is not necessarily disastrous for
development. Thanks to improved financial
management (an aspect of centralisation),
election-geared rent creation may not be so great
as to seriously upset macroeconomic balance,
and the country may be considered relatively
investor-friendly as a result. Indeed, if this type
of election financing contributes to overall
regime stability, the investment effect might be
net-positive.
But if seriously unproductive rent creation gets
into strategically important sectors of the
economy, like roads, power, or port facilities,
public goods crucial for business are likely to be
under-provided, and investment and
performance will consequently be sub-par. APPP
researchers believe the majority of African
states are currently in this predicament. Buoyed
by a favourable external environment, they
have been growing at around 5–6 per cent per
annum in recent years. Nevertheless, we think
performance in most remains below potential,
and are sceptical of the idea of an Asian-style
poverty-reducing economic transformation. And
if rent-driven election financing generates
anger and resentment, perhaps because, as in
Kibaki’s Kenya, it takes an ethnically exclusive
form, the net impact on investment is likely to
be negative (see EIU 2008, 2009). Figure 2
illustrates what we take to be the African modal
pattern.
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Figure 2 Rent management in the African modal pattern
Generalised clientelism
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3 Problems with developmental patrimonialism
Our research shows that provided rent
management can be centralised and oriented to
the long term, neo-patrimonialism is compatible
with strong economic performance. We can
confidently assert, then, that in some cases neo-
patrimonialism can be harnessed for
developmental ends. More than this, our results
show that all of the strong performers in our
sample had this institutional mix, raising the
possibility that transformational performance in
Africa may only be possible by centralising rents
and steering them to the long term.
But that does not mean that developmental
patrimonialism should be the new model that
donors and policymakers should be rushing to
promote in Africa, not least because it comes
associated with several problems.
One is a question mark over whether it can be
implemented in contemporary political
conditions. Our cases have shown that multi-
party democracy presents powerful incentives for
African leaders to focus on the short term,
relaxing the strictures on rent creation and
corruption, and making long-horizon rent
management more difficult to achieve. Rwanda,
the only clear-cut contemporary example in our
caseload has been able to square centralised
long-horizon rent management with multi-party
democracy partly through use of a specific
institutional vehicle – Tristar. Tristar is a party
holding company that has been able to provide
capital for joint ventures in hitherto untapped
areas of economic potential, channel funds to the
ruling party for electoral and other purposes, and
channel profits into politically important social
infrastructure projects. This has allowed the RPF
(Rwandese Patriotic Front) to take a tough line
on corruption in other areas of the
administration, creating a virtuous circle of
public goods creation and development. Because
party holding companies, common in Asia, less so
in Africa, might be possible institutional
solutions to perverse election pressures in
contemporary Africa, we are also researching
‘partystatals’ in Ethiopia and elsewhere.
Nevertheless, it would be naive to ignore the fact
that an important element in the Rwandan
regime’s ability to successfully centralise rents is
that it is unquestionably a constrained
democracy, a ‘hard’ state with a reputation for
political intolerance that places it closer to our
other single-party developmental patrimonial
regimes than to some of Africa’s more
competitive polities. The economic potential of
developmental patrimonial systems, then, should
be set against the loss of civil liberties they may
entail.
The second problem is that even in our sample’s
most successful states, developmental
patrimonialism proved unsustainable over the
longer term. There are a number of reasons for
this. One is that decentralising pressures tended
to build up over time. In our cases, these
variously took the form of pressures to Africanise
the civil service, to find parastatal jobs for
school-leavers, and to include ethnic groups who
had been on the fringes of clientelist networks. It
was an unfortunate coincidence that these
pressures coincided with an adverse shift in
external conditions, and with internal succession
crises. In this context, ageing leaders, ‘fathers’ of
their nations, either died or proved incapable of
maintaining former discipline. Counterfactual
conditions can of course be imagined in which all
these crises did not strike at the same time,
allowing strong economic performance to be
sustained for longer, as in Asia. However, it is
clear that today’s aspiring developmental
patrimonialists (Rwanda, perhaps Angola, South
Africa, Malawi and Ethiopia) need to work on the
details of an inclusive yet dynamic economic
policy – probably a rural bias policy – and to
establish a viable system for political succession,
if good results are to be sustained. It is also
probable that even in the best cases,
developmental patrimonialism has a limited
shelf-life. After a couple of decades of growth, an
economy is likely to be sufficiently sophisticated
and diversified as to require a more impersonal
management form.
Finally, it should be noted that in some countries,
developmental patrimonialism is probably a non-
starter. Where centrifugal pressures are very
strong, perhaps for ethnic reasons, any serious
attempt to centralise rents is likely to prove
excessively controversial. Nigeria, and even
contemporary Kenya, spring to mind. Other
states, like Equatorial Guinea or Congo-
Brazzaville, may have administrations in which
professional standards have been so eroded by
economic decline and political interference, that
they have fallen below a threshold at which
developmental patrimonialism is conceivable.4
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Notes
* Tim Kelsall would like to thank Richard
Crook and David Booth for editorial
comments on this article, and to acknowledge
the role of David Booth, Diana Cammack and
Fred Golooba-Mutebi in providing integral
contributions to an earlier version.
1 The Ivorian equivalent of a marketing board,
although operated in a uniquely successful way.
2 Arguably after 1969, the Luo did not get much
milk at all.
3 We speculate that increased media and civil
society scrutiny of corruption encourages this
interstitial position. Presidents know they
need to raise election funds, but they should
also be sufficiently distanced from the process
for ‘plausible deniability’ to apply. This may
have the perverse effect of relaxing the
discipline around corruption (see APPP 2011).
4 Although the recent history of Malawi gives
some cause for optimism that with the right
political will, a very weak administrative state
can be significantly rehabilitated.
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